This p~er studies the association between a finn's stock returns and subsequent top management chAMes. Con~ieut w~th hmmml monitoring of management, there is an inverse relation between the probability of a management change and a firm's share performance. ~ relation can result from monitoring by the board, other top numagers, or b!oe?~older~. However, unless share performance is extremely good or bad, logit models have wo predictive ability. No average stock price reaction is detected a*. announcement of a top manasement change.
Introduefion
This paper investigates the relation between a firm's stock price performance and subsequent changes in its top management. A top management change is defined as any change in the set of individuals holding the title of chief executive officer (CEO), president, or chairman of the board. The major hypothesis is that the probability of a top management change is inversely related to stock price performance. Using a random sample of listed firms, the hypothesis is tested with a prediction procedure to exploit information on firms that do not experience a management change. In addition, standard event study methodology is employed to study stock price reaction to announcement of management change.
The p~oer provides new evidence on mechanisms for removing inefficient managers and encouraging managers to act in shareholders' interests. Although external mechanisms such as the takeover market can serve this function [e.g., Manne (1965) and Fama and Jensen (1983) ], there are potentially important internal mechani,~ms. One is monitoring by the board of *We thank Ray Ball, Mike Barclay, Jim BricHey, Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo, Cliff Holdemess, Richard Leftwich, John Long, Bill Mecldin8, Krishna Palepu, Bill Schwert, Dick Vancil, Eric Wruck, Jerry Zimmerman, Andrei Shleifer (the referee), and Michel Jensen (the editor) for their comments on earlier drafts. directors [Fama (1980) ]. A second is mutual monitoring among the firm's managers [Fama and Jensen (1983) ]. A third is monitoring by holders of large share blocks [Sldeifer and ¥~shny (1986) ]. If these mechanisms are effective, and if stock price performance reflects information on managers' efficiency, there w m be a negative relation between the probability of a top management change and share performance.
Results using logit analysis are strongly consistent with the hypothesized relation. However, unless performance is extremely good or bad, the logit models have no predictive ability. Top management changes following poor share performance can take a variety of forms. These include, for example, the replacement of current managers or the addition of new managers from inside or outside the firm. The result~ for CEO changes extend those reported elsewhere [Coughlan and Schm; dt (1985) and Weisbach (1988) ].
Evidence on the specific functional form of the management change/share performance relation is also examined. Share performance relative to market performance is a better predicto~ of management changes than is the firm's stock return. These results ~,ugge~t that management is not held acc~ountable for some factors outside its control. However, examination of tJJe ti:rting of management changes indicates that any response to poor perforn~arce is not immediate and can take up to two years.
The event study results indicate that individual securities have a very small stock price reaction at announcement of a top management change. ,-'~ average effect is zero. For reasons discussed later, it is difficult to te~' hypotheses about management changes in the context of an announcement effect study. Results among seven such studies are contradictory./No attempt is made to resolve differences among these studies. However, the contrast between this paper's strong prediction and weak announcement effect results provides an example of i'ow hypotheses that focus on the prediction of an event can yield insights not available from a study of announcement effects. Further, absen_,:e of strong evidence that stock prices decrease on announcement indicates the logit results are not simply due to the market's anticipation of an unfavorable event (i.e., a management change).
Section 2 discusses the structta'~ of the firm's top management team and the relation between stock price performance and management changes. Data used to test hypotheses are described in section 3. Section 4 describes the. prediction methodology and results. Section 5 outlines the event study methodology and reports results. Section 6 summarizes the study, presen~ conduIFor their overall sample, three of the seven studies find sta~¢fically significant positive ~Onormal performance [see Bonnier and Bnmer (1986) , Furtado and gozeff (1987) , and Weisbach (1988) ], three find no significant abnormal performance [see Borstadt (1985) , Klein, Kim, and Mahajan (1985) , and Reinganum (1985) ], and one finds significang negative abnormal performance [see Furt~o 09~,6)1. sions, and suggests possible extensions. An appendix contains details of the event study tests.
Stock perlonnanee and top nmnagement changes
This section discusses the structure of top management, signals about management performance associated with stock price changes, and different types of management changes.
The firm's top management
Top management is defined here as the set of individuals holding the title of CEO, president, or chairman of the board. For listed firms, top management most often consists of two individuals. 2 In such a case, one is chairman, tl'e other is president, and one of these individuals usually holds the title CEO.
Recognizing that top management is not res~cted to one individual raisf s the possibility that competition between top managers is an important force affecting management turnover. For example, there are cases in which the chairman/CEO tries to oust the president, and vice versa) Thus, while other empirical work on turnover emphasizes the role of the board of directors [see Cough_lan and Schmidt (1985) and Weisbach (1988) ], the board is not the only force disciplining top managers. Monitoring by other parties, such as large blockholders [Shleifer and Vishny (1986) ], can also result in management changes. 4 Since blockholders can be directors or serve as top ravagers, the forces of managerial competition, board monitoring, and block ownership seem interrelated. 5 Limited evidence on the role of these factors in observed management changes is discussed later.
2For this paper's sample of randondy :,elected New York and American Stock Exchange-listed firms, 65.7% had two team members in 1978 and 34.3% had o~ne. Prior to 1967, the majority o[ sample firms had o:~dy one individual as a top ma~,ager. Additional evidence of an increase in top management team .~e over time is presented in ~0ancil (1987, ~pp. A, exhibits 1.1-1.3).
31n Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., the chalrman/CEO was responsible for ~e ouster of the president (Wall Street Journal, November 12, 1969) . In the case of American Metal Climax, the president won out in a three-year power struggle with the chairman and CEO, and the chairman resigned his position. The outcome cannot be attributed solely to competition between managers because nonmanager blockholders who had board seats also played a key role by supporting the president (Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1967) . 4An example co~d be Le~ch Valley Industries. The president/CEO resigned after a policy dispute with the largest shareholder, who was chairman (Wall Street Journal, February 12, 1969) .
SThe relation between blockholding and board directorship is recognized by Shleifer and Vishny (1986, p. 474, fn. 19) .
Information associated with stock returns
Although top managers' contribution to firm value is not directly observable, stock returns are a potential source of information. In an ef~cient market, however, stock return is a noisy measure of management performance. The return reflects only the unexpected component of top management performance and is influenced by a variety of exogenous factors.
Given the noise in stock returns, alternative sources of information, such as earnings reports, could provide measures more closely associatc.~l with management performance. Some measures could incorporate information not reflected in stock returns. For example, the board, the top managers, and lower-level managers can obtain inside information from working closely with each other. Thus, any relation between stock returns and subsequent turnover understates the responsiveness of these parties to poor manager performance. Tois paper's major testable proposition is that the probability of a top management change is inversely related to stock price performance. The proposition is a joint test of the hypotheses that information about managemeat performance is reflected in stock returns and that such information is used in evaluating performance. That stock returns be used in evaluating performance is not a necessary condition for this proposition; it is sufficient that the performance measures used are correlated with stock returns.
To examine the extent to which management is held accountable for stock returns, the role of market and industry factors is explored. For example, suppose performance relative to the market is taken into account. Then for a given level of own stock return, better market performance indicates poorer relative performance and should be associated with a higher probability of a management change. Taking into account market and industry factors could be one way the responsiveness to a given stock return differs across firms. 6 Howevcr, a complete analysis of the cross-sectional deter~ninants of firms' responsiveness to stock performance is beyond the scope of this study.
Management changes following poor stock performance
Management changes occur for different reasons, and differ in their a priori relation with prior share performance. Some could follow good performance, and others could have no relation to prior performance. In either case, inclusion of such changes biases tests against finding an inverse relation between share perfol-mance and top management changes. To address this potential problem, several types of management changes are studied using information on the details of observed management changes. 6Weisbach (1988) extends this analysis and presents evidence that board composition is a determinant of cross.sectionrA differences in response to poor performance.
,~brced departures. Termination of top manager's employment is more likely to be a response to poor management performance than are management. changes in general. Few management changes ate described as terminations in press announcements. As discussed later, however, it is possible to identify those cases in which the management change involves a top manager's leaving the firm~ and in which he is most likely to have been forced out as a consequence of poor performance.
Changes involving outsiders. Replacement of a team member or an addition to the management team can be made either by promoting a current lower-level manager or by hiring from outside the firm. Hiring an outsider involves potential costs not borne by the firm wi~ an insider. For example, the outside appointment can adversely affect insiders' incentives. If insiders revise downward their probability of achieving a top management position, their motivation to perform is reduced [Lazear and Rosen (1981) ]. In addition, to function effectively the outsider will have to acquire firm-specific human capital. Given the hypothesized costs, an outsider appointment must involve substantial benefits. These benefits are likely to be greater in situations where management p,,-*rformance is poor. A caveat is that some outsider appointments occur as part of a firm expansion into new areas in which the firm has no specific human capital. 7 If such firm expansion occurs after the firm has done relatively well, the predicted inverse relation between share performance and outsider appointments is reduced.
CEO changes. Previous work on turnover and performance focuses solely on CEO changes. This paper's definition of a top management change includes many changes htb.at are pl:obably fled to performance but do not involve a CEO. CEO changes are probably also linked to performance and are examined here. In addition, it is useful to distingttsh important from unimportant CEO changes. For example, Vancil (1987) argues that many CEO changes are part of the normal succession process; it is common for the chairman and CEO to pass the CEO title to the president, s This kind of CEO change is not included as a management change in this paper because it does not irtvolve a change in the group of individuals comprising top management. Title changes alone are less likely to be related_ to poor performance, and excluding them should ,..-eu~ical brought in a new president who had headed a large drug 7For example, Allied r,t. _: company. The move was 'viewed as an attempt to strengthen Allied's move into consumer markets' (Wall Street .r.au.m~t, December 27, 1968) . This chaage enters the paper's s~tpl~, and detailed information Is given in Vancil (1987, ch. 5, pp. 158-162) . Vavcii (1987, ch. 1, pp. 13-31) .
enhance the ability t.o detect a relation between stock price performance and subsequent man~e~nent changes. 9
4. An event study perspective
The major questions in this paper are best addressed by examining the association between stock perfo~ and subsequent management changes. Additional information can be obtained using standard event study procedures to examine stock price reaction ~ound announcement of top management changes.
Stock price reaction at announcement. Stock price reaction at announcement of a management c[~ange can indicate whether the capital market considers the event significant. However, predictions about the sign of the abnormal stock price effect at announce~t are not precise even if the change is a response to poor performance, in shareholders' interests, and unanticipated. One reason is that announcement of a change can convey other inforn~tion. 1°
For example, suppose the extent of management's poor performance was not previously known to the market. Then abnormal stock return at announcement is the sum of two components. One is an information component that is negative if the change signals worse management performance than anticipated. The second is a real component that is positive if the change is in shareholders' interest. A positive net effect is expected only if the real component is larger in absolute value than the information component, n Although each component is unobservable, it is possible to examine whether, on average, the sum of firm's information and real components is equal to zero. This is equivalent to testing for shifts in the mean of the cross-sectional distribution of abnormal returns. These tests can fail to det~¢ a mean stock price response W announcement ff some ~:~as have a positive response and others a negative response such that the average response is zero. To address • this possibility, ~ests for shifts in the variance of excess returns are also employed, and indicate whether a stock price effect exists, regardless of its sign. Such tests are widely useA in the accounting literature [e.g., Beaver (1968) ].
9However, even for title changes, there could be some relation if the timing of the change is discretionary, and a planned change is implemented sooner if performance is poor.
t°Although a similar problem arises in other types of announcement effect studies, it is very unclear in this case how to control for, or study, these effects.
xtB,~-~..-Aer and Brunet (1986) address this issue by sampling management changes where the firm has prior poor dividend and earnings performance. This should reduce any negative information component and increase the probability that the observed abnormal return measures the real componen:. Of the seven event studies of management change announcements, Bonnier and Brunet report the largest positive abnormal return on announcement. This is consistent with management change announcements having a positive real, but negative information effect.
Preannouncement performance. If poor performance leads to a management change, negative stock performance should be present before this event for a sample of observed changes. Examination of pre-event abnormal performance thus provides a useful check on the prediction results.
However, examining pre-event stock price behavior for a sample of observed management changes does not address some important issues directly. One is precisely how the probability of a management change depends on the level of stock price performance, and the relevant measure of performance. A related issue is whether stock price performance is a good predictor of a management change. In contrast, prediction procedures used in this paper examine these issues explicitly, with pot,,~atial gains from exploiting information on firms that do not experience a management change.
Data

Sample flrms
The sample consists of 269 firms listed on the New York and American Stock Exchanges (NYSE and AMEX) on July 2, 1962. Every sixth firm from alphabetical lists of exchange-listed firms is included, t2 the relation between stock price performance and management changes do not depend on which source is used to identify a change. Although the frequency of changes from each source is reported in this section, results ie the rest of the paper are based on changes reported in the ;VS./. is Time series of changes. Table 1 Table 2 reports the number of changes per firm (panel A) and the number of WSJ changes per firm (panel B). Of the 137 firms surviving the entire sample period, 9 (7%) have no top management changes and 20 (15~;) have only one change. The corresponding numbeJ~ fo~ WSJ changes axe ,.-, "~ ~.,,~1 ~,,p and 40 (29%).
Identifying top management changes
Identifying forced departures
Whether a change involves a CEO, an outsider, or a top manager !eaving the firm is readily determined from the WSJ article and Poor's. However, identification of forced departures ls diSeuit because press releases rarely describe them as such. To isolate changes most likely to have been forced departures, details of the WS,/ articles are examined. As discussed below, changes are included in the forced departure sample if they involve a top managers' leaving the firm and the reason in the WS, Y article appears consistent with a forced departure. Table 3 gives the distribution of reasons reported in the WS:I for managers' leaving the top management team. Of the 351 changes in the sample, 220 involve at least one top manager's leaving the team. These 220 changes involve 230 departees.
The most commonly reported reason is retirement. This term could be a euphemism for a forced departure. This possibility is investigated by using birthdates reported in Poor's to calculate the ages of managers !ea~.ng the team. Poor's yields 59 birthdates for individuals described in the WSJ as retiring and 103 birthdates for departees not described as retiring. The ages of individuals described as retiring are symmetrically distributed around the age commonly used in retirement policies (65); the modal and median ages are both 65 and the mean age is 65.6. Further, age is relatively tightly distributed around 65. These numbers suggest a substantial proportion of reported retirements are m fact retirements. This impression is reinforced when the retiree's age distribution is compared with the age distribution of departees who are not described as retirin~ Departees not described as retiring are generally younger. Their mean age is 59.5. Their median and modal ages are 59 and 53, respectively. The t-statistic for the difference in mean ages of retirees and other departee$ is 4.3. Given this evidence, reposed retirements are e~:eluded from the forced departure sample°
The second most commonly reported reason for an individual's leaving the top management team is that the manager is taking another position in the firm. Since most of these changes involve a part-time position and ate similar to retirements, they are excluded from the forced departure sample. 16 Similarly, the 13 cases in which a top management change occurs at the same time as a transfer of a block of common shares (a control change) are excluded from the forced departure sample. These changes probably involve external disciplining of the board and top management. Fi~lly, ill health and death are unlikely to be internal mechanisms for removing nonperforming managers. Changes ir .~Ang those reasons are excluded from the forced departure sample.
Exclusion of changes that have death, health, retirement, assumption of another position within the firm or a control change as the reported reason resets m a sample of ~ ~r ~_u~gement changes classified as forced departures. F.ach change involves one individual. Reported reasons for these changes include poor performance (10), t7 pursue other interests (7), take a position outside the firm (6), policy reasons (5), and fired (1). For 35 departures no ~e.:lson is reported and these are also classified as forced departures.
Details of forced departures.
To provide additional evider~ce on the underlying reason for a management change, each W&I article for the forced departure subsample is studied. Details of the process leading to the departure are typically sparse, but are consistent with the change resulting from internal monitoring by blockholders, managers and/or the board. !n 15 of the 64 departures a blockholder is identified in the WSJ. Is In six of these the blockholder plays an active role in the change. 19 The active blockholder is another corporation in three cases and the chairman in two cases. In the sixth case two b!ockholders successfully back one top manager in a power struggle against another. In another two departures, the article suggests the change was rein a few cases the change is an apparent demotion (e.g., from CEO to division head). l~In all ten cases poor earnings are mentioned in the report. In two cases (Argus, 8/29/69, and Chock Full O'Nu~, 2/8/65) statements by the firm hold the departing manager responsible.
lSIn two cases the blockholder is identified from previous management change articles. 19Blockholders are defined as playing an active role when: (i) the management change is described as evidence the blockholder is becoming more involved in managing the company; (ii) the blockholder is described as having a co~rontation or policy difference with, or being unhappy with, the depanee; or (iii) the bl~khoider is described as supporting another top manager in a power struggle with the departee. The board as a whole is re~arded as being involved when the board in general is described as deciding a new manager is required. outsider is defined as a newly appointed member of the top management team whose previous en~k~y-~-ent is outside the tirol ©CEO replaeement is defined as a top management change in which a new CEO is appointed or the CEO title is created for a new top manager.
initiated by the board as a whole. In one of these, the board chairman is a major blockholder. Table 4 shows the relative frequency of CEO replacements, outsider changes, and managers leaving the firm for the full sample of 567 changes (panel A) and for the sample of 351 WSd changes (panel B) . Differences between the samples seem small. The relative frequency of outside appointments and managers leaving the firm is similar in the Poor's and WSJ subsamples and the relative frequency of CEO replacements is only slightly greater in the WSJ sample. Outside appointments have a relative frequency of 0.19 in both samples and managers leaving the fh,~ have a relative frequency of 0.64 for the full sample and 0,59 for the WSJ sample. The relative frequency of CEO replacements is 0.29 in the full sample and 0.36 for the ~TJ sample. The relative frequency of changes involving both a CEO change and a manager leaving the ~m is also slightly greater for the WSJ sample (0.24) than for the full sample (0.21).
Summary statistics for subsamples
Predicting top management changes
The relation between the probability of a top management change and various measures of stock performance is estimated using logit regressions. The dependent variable is one if a top management change occurs during the period in question and zero otherwise. Independent variables are measures of stock pri~..'~ performance.
The magnitude and duration of share performance req,.fired to affect the probability of a management change are not apparent a priori. Thus, performance is measured over various periods. Depending on the specific model a period is defined as one quarter, a half-year, one year, two years, or three years. The independent variables are own stock return, lags of owe stock return, market return, and lags of market return. For contemporaneous and lagged own stock return, the expected coefficient sign is negative. It is hypothesized that poorer performance is associated with an increased probability of a nmnagem~t ch~.b.~n-ge. For contemporaneous and lagged market return, the expected coefficient sign is positive. For a ~ven level of own stock return, better market performance indicates poorer relative performance and should be associated with a higher probability of a management change. To save space, only those results based on half-year and one-year periods are presented. Table 5 presents logit regression results using annual data under four definitions of a management change. 2° These are 1) all WSJ changes, 2) CEO changes, 3) outsider changes, and 4) changes classified as forced departures. 21 The independent variables are own stock return, three lags of own stock return, market return as measured by the return to the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) equally-weighted market index, and three lags of market return. As discussed below, baseline results indicate there is a response to s~,re performance in the predicted direction. Ho~vever, the lag between performance and a management change can be up to two years.
Baseline results
The logit model produces s'|'c:~aificant results for all types of change except outsider changes. 22 As predicted, for all types of changes the sign of the coefficient on own return variables is negative. The coefficient on the current 2°The underlying data are pcx~ied cross-section and time-series data. A sinsle firm pro~s many regression observations as periods it survives between 1963 and 1978. For example, a firm surviving from 1963 through the end of 1970 accounts for eight observations in models based on annual performance and 16 observations in models based on six-month performance.
21 Changes due to death or ill-health and control changes are excluded from all four categories. 22For all WS/changes the model p-value is 0.07; it is 0.01 for CEO changes and forced departures. For outsider changes the model p-value is 0.50. ,.x top management change is defined as any ehanse in the set of individ~aL¢ holding the titles CEO, president, or chairman of the board.
bReturns to the firm's stock age measured over one calendar year. Market returns are measured over one calendar year and are returns to the CRSP equally-weighted market index.
CA CEO change is defined as a top management change in which a new CEO is appointed or the CEO position is created for a new top manager.
dAn outsider change is defined as a top management change in which a newly appointed member of the top manasement team was not previously an employ~ of the .fi_rm~.
eA forced departure is defined as a tfp manager leaving the firm_ .with no reason reported for the departure or the reported reason is poor performance, other interests, take a position with another firm, policy difference, or firing,. tSignilicant at 0.10 level. gS~J~ificant at 0.05 level.
year's own return is statistically significant for a~l categories. For all WSJ changes, lag one return is also significant. When a market return variable is significant, the coefficient is positive, as predicted. Current-year market return has a significant positive coefficient for all categories except outsider changes. However, the only significant lagged market return variable is the lag two market return for forced departures. From table 5, the impact of stock price performance on the probability of a management change is larger for CEO changes, outsider changes, and forced departures than for WSJ changes. The coefficient on the current year's own return is -1.37 for forced departures, -1.17 for CEO changes, and -0.88 for outsider changes, but only -0.42 for all WSJ clumges. For the current year's market return the estimated coefficient is 1.84 for forced departures, 1.23 for CEO changes, and 1.19 for outsider changes, but only 0.57 for all :4rSJ changes. The estimated coefficients reported for each type of change are significantly different at the 0.01 level from ~e ~im~j,~,-I coefficient for all WSJ changes. Differences in the magnitude cf estimated coefficients between all WS./changes and forced departures indicate that the forced departure subsample exhibits a stronger relation between share performance and management changes than other types of changes. 2s Table 6 presents results based on half-year periods of performance. The qualq'tative conclusions are similar to those using annual data, althou~ the models do not work as well. 24 Coefficient estimates are generally negative for own return variables and positive for market return variables, though not as consistently so as in annual models. Foz forced departures, current own return, lag one and lag two returns are si~ificant. For all WSJ changes lag one and lag two returvs are significant. For outsider changes only lag two return is significant. For r~.O changes none of the half-year measures of performance are si~ ~fi¢~ ,~t. Market return measles are not significant in any of the models, itesults are consistent with share performance affecting the probability of a management change within two years of, but ~ot concurrent with, the performance.
Examining the goodness of fit of the logit model
Underl3~ng the coefficient estimates in tables 5 and 6 is the assumption that. the probability of a management is well described by the logistic function. To explore further the appropriateness of the logit model, for each year from 1963 through 1978 each firm is assigned to a decile based on that year's ranked own 23Whell the logit model is re-estimated excluding the 11 firms for which poor performance ¢." firing is the reported mason for the departure, the results for each sample are similar to those reported in table 5. 24Model p-values are 0.13 for all WSJ changes, and 0.28, 0.76, 0.02 for CEO changes, outsider changes, and forced departures, respectively. aA top management chanbe is defined as any change in the set of individuals holding the floes CEO, president, or chairman of the board.
bReturns to the firm's stock are measured over six calendar months. Market returns are measured over six calend~ mon*.hs an-d ~ returns to the CRSP equally-weighted market index.
CA CEO change is defined as a top management change in which a new CEO is appointed or the C~ position is created for a new top manager. ¢tlA~ outsider change is defined as a top management change in which a newly appointed member of the top management team was not previously an employee of the firm. CA forced departure is defined as a top manager leaving the firm ~th no reason reported for the departure or the reported reason is poor performance, other interests, take a position with another , policy difference, or firing. a. nificant at 0.10 level. sSignificant at 0.05 level. stock return. Within a decile, the implied probab'tlity of a management change is calculated for each observation from logit model coefficients in table 5. Implied probabilities are averaged within each decile. The mean probability for each decile is compared to the actual turnover rate; a X2-test is used to test for a difference in the actual number of changes across deciles ef performance. In addition, for individual observations a significant positive correlation is expected between predicted probabilities and the realiTed value of the dependent variable.
From table 7, it appears that only extreme levels of stock price performance affect the likelihood of a top management change. Panei A reports results for all WSJ changes when performance is measured on an annual basis. Mean annual own stock return ranges from -0.516 in the first decile to 1.270 in the tenth decile. The mean predicted probabilities decline monotonically from 0.128 for the group of worst pedormers to 0.086 for the best performers. Firms in the worst decile of performers are predicted to be about 1.5 times as likely to have a top management change as firms in the best decile of performers.
Consistent with predictions of the fitted logit model, the first and last deciles have the highest and lowest actual turnover rates of 0.139 and 0.083, respectively, and the difference is statistically si~ificant (X2= 3.0, significant at the 0.10 level). The rank order correlation coefficient between predicted probabilities and the dependent variable is 0.088 (p-value = 0.10). This positive association indicates that in an overall sense the model works well; the predicted probability is higher when the dependent variable is one and lower when it is zero. 25
However, across deciles actual turnover rates are not monotonically decreasing. For example, deciles four and five have higher turnover rates than two and three, even though their own return performance is better. The hypothesis that the turnover frequency is equal across all ten deciles cannot be rejected. The lack of monotonicity is inconsistent with the logit predictions. Even if the true relation is monotonic, however, such a fmdino ~ could be the result of measurement error. The act'a~ frequency of changes within a decile is only an estimate of the expected frequency conditional on a given level of performance. If the variance of the estimate for each decile is large in relation to the across-decile variation in the true conditional expected frequency, some apparent departures from monotonicity will be observed.
Data for the forced departure sample are presented in panel B of table 7. 26 Again, the average "~redicted probability decreases monotonically, from 0.031 25Within-decile rar~ order correlations are also examined. For deciles one, four, and seven the correlation is positive and significant at the 0.05 level. For all other decries the correlation is positive but insignificant, with the exception of ~ecile ten, where the correlation is slighdy negative (-0.005, p-value = 0.90).
2eDecile-based results for CEO changes ~d ,J,~:~er changes are similar to results for ",d] ~ changes, in decile one to 0.007 in decile ten. A X2-test shows that the difference in the actual turnover rate between deciles one and ten ~ significant at the 0.05 level.
The rank order correlation of 0.092 (p-value--0.05) between predicted probabilities a_n_d the dependent variable is consistent with the logit predictions. 27 However, the difference in actual turf ,¢er across deciles is driven by decile one. The turnover rate t~:~ere is 0.060, almost three times that in any other decile and twice the predicted probability under the logit specification. As in panel A, unless performance is extreme, the model has no predictive ability. Furthermore, a turnover rate of 0.06 for firms m the lowest decile of performance indicates that even conditional on poor performance, the likelihood of a forced departure is not high. Coupled with earlier results that the lag between performance and a management change can be up to two years, the evidence indicates that management turnover is not highly sensitive to poor share performance.
Sensitivity analyses
Industry factors. In addition to own stock return and market return and their lags, both industry return and lagged industry return, measured as the return to all firms with the same two-digit SIC code, are included as independent variables. As with the market return, the expected sign of industry return and lagged industry return variables is positive. In logit regressions, industry, return variables are typically insignificant. 28 Signs of own return, market ~eturn, and their lags remain negative and positive, respectively, but their statistical significance is reduced. Use of an industry index appears to add noise, rather than explanatory power, to the model. Either industry performance is not associated with measures used to evaluate managers, or two-digit SiC-codebased measures ~e very noisy.
Alternative st6ck performance benchmarks. An alternative approach is to use a standard share performance measure and its lags as independent variables in logit regressions. Results using mean adjusted own return, market model abnormal return, or a market ~nd industry adjusted abnom~ ! return also indicate a negative relation between the probability of a m~agement clmnge and performance. However, no alternative measure provides additional explanatory power over results presented in tables 5 and 6.
2~The strength of the correlation varies widely across dedles. Deciles one and three have the strongest correlations, with values of 0.197 and 0.180 (both significant at the 0.05 level), In decile eight, the correlation is negative (-0.121, p-value = 0.10).
2SThe exception is lag one industry return in the CEO changes model. It is sigrdficant!y v,w,~ted sign. negative, the opposite of ~e -..a.
£ Warner et al., St~k prices and management changes
Alternative definitions of forced departures. In addition to the definition of forced departures used in tables 5 through 7, an alternative definition of forced departures is constructed based on the age of the manager leaving the firm. As in tables 5 through 7, departures except those due to death, ill-health, or control change are inclt~ded as forced departures. In addition, departures in which the departee is either 64 or 65 years old are excluded. Assuming the closer the departee is to 65 years old the more likely the change is a routine retirement, this definition could better identify changes due to poor performance that are camouflaged in press reports. Ren~oving changes in which the departing manager is 64 or 65 does not significantly affect results. Using the reported reasons for departure in the WSJ appears to be a more effective way of isolating management changes associated with poor performance.
Unconditional turnover and firm size. Results presented in sections 4.1 and 4.2 do not address the issue of how turnover rates vary across firms independent of the level of performance. To the extent that systematic differences in unconditional turnover are not controlled for, noise is injected into the analysis. Though a complete analysis is beyond the scope of this study, the data provide an opportunity to examine one variable that could be important in understanding differences in unconditional turnover rates across firm¢, namely, finn size.
When the natural log of firm size 29 is included in the logit analysis as an explanatory variable, the coefficient is sitmificantly positive for all WSJ changes and forced departures. It appears that larger firms have higher 'normal' management turnover. Perhaps their promotion and retirement policies are designed to ensure shorter tenures in top management positions. Mother potential explanation is simply that larger firm_s have larger management teams. With a larger team the probability of at least one change is increased. However, a positive correlation between firm size and management team size does not fully exp!~n thee results.
To control for the size of the management team, the number of top managers is also included as an independent variable. ~° The coefficient on the team size variable is significant and positive for all categories. The coefficient' on firm size remains positive and statistically significant for all WSJ changes and forced departures. For outsider changes the coefficient on firm size is significantly negative, even ~ter controlling for the size of the management 2°Firm size. is measured as the sum of the market value of equity and the beok value of long-term debt.
~Logit regressions for CEO change~ control for differenc,~; in management team size because a firm has only one CEO. Firm size has an insi~nificaot coefliciem in the CEO changes category. Similar evidence is provided in Comment (1985, tables 23 and 24) . He finds that firms with larger numbers of officers and managers have nigher turnover in the top management team, but not in the CEO position.
team. This is ~nsistent with Furlado and Rozefl" (1987) , who raise the possibility that large firms are less likely to go outside the firm to recruit ~ew managers because they have access to a bigger internal market for managers. 31
Event study results
,5.1. Statt~iical methods
Standard event study methodology is employed to analyze stock price behavior around the announcement of a top management change. Market model prediction errors are used to measure unusual stock price performance for each firm. Both daily and monthly prediction errors are examined. Procedures for assessing the statistical significance of the prediction errors are outlined below. Details are provided in the appendix.
For various event periods, prediction errors are averaged across sample firms. To assess the statistical significance of mean prediction errors, a standardized test statistic is constructed. Each prediction error is standardized by the square root of its estimated forecast variance. The mean of these standardized prediction errors has a distribution that is ~pproximately unit normal under the null hypothesis that the m~n standardized prediction error is equal to zero. 32
To test for unusual stock F2ice performance independent of sign, mean standardized squared pre¢~Action errors are examined. The test statistic used to assess the significance of the mean standardized squared prediction error has a theoretical distribution that is approximately unit normal under the null hypothesis that the mean prediction error equals zero and there is no va,'iance change at announcement. In the absence of unusual performance, the expected value of the mean standardized squared prediction error is one. 33 3ZLogit models run separately on firms smaller and larger than the median size in~cate a possible difference in their response to share performance. Results indicate own return, not market return, is important in explaining the probability of a management change for small firms. Market return, not own return, is important in explaining the probability of a management change for large firms. These results could merely indicate that a large firm's return is more highly correlated with the market index than a small firm's ret~.
32See Dotld and Warner (1953. p. 43~ 33Simulation evidence raises the possibility that this test sta~stic misstates the significance level, rejecting the null hypothesis too often [Dodd, Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1984, p. 37)] To address this potential problem, this paper reports rankings of mean standardized squared prediction errors relative to their empirical sampling distribution during a 90-day period surrounding announcement. To check whether results are driven by a few ob~r~ations, values of -,edi~al standardized squared prediction errors are also reported and ranked relative to their empirical sampling distribution. This procedure understates the significance of announcement day results if there is a generalized variance increase during this 90-day period. Results for all WSJ changes. For the sample of al~ WS:! changes, there is no evidence of average abnormal performance before or at announcement. In the period comprising days -1 and 0, the mean prediction error is 0.31~ with a z-statistic of 1.36. The cumulative mean prediction error from days -59 through 0 is 1.25~ (z-statistic = 1.27).
Results: Daily abnormal performance
Variance shift tests indicate a small security price reaction at the announcement of a top management change. The mean standar~tized squared prediction error for the -1 to 0 interval is 1.39, ranking fourth highest among two day periods over the -59 to 30 interval. The median standardized squared prediction error is 0.62 and ranks second. Although these results are statistically significant, they seem economically unimpressive. For e~mmple, the mean absolute two-day prediction error increases only about 15~ c~:~nditional on announcement, from 2.37~ to 2.73~$. The increase in mean absolute prediction error is only about an eighth of a point on a $50 stock.
There is some evidence of a postaunouncement stock price drop. The mean cumulative prediction error is -1.75~ for days 5 through 30 (z---2.69). However, the price movements are not concentrated in the days imrned~tely following announcement; from days + 1 through + 4 there is no unusual stock price movement. The lag between announcement and the appearance of negative abnormal performance is surprising given the earlier finding of a variance shift on announcement. There is a possibility that the negative abnormal performance is unrelated to the announcement. As discussed later, the evidence on postannouncement stock price drop is stronger when it is examined in detsi!o Because the sample has no obvious ex post selection bias, the possibility of a profitable trading rule (ignoring transactions costs) from going short at announcement cannot be dismissed. in all cases there is evidence of a variance shift at days -1 to 0. Negative abnorm~ performance is detected following announcement, but is not concentrated in or confined to the days immediately following announcement. For example, in the for~od depa~are subsample, the cumulative mean prediction error for days 5 through 30 is -4.30~; (z = -2.37). The one exception to the generally similar behavior for subsamples is for forced departures, where there is weak evidence of negative abnormal performance in the weeks preceding the announcement of a top management change. For days -59 through -6, the cumulative mean prediction error is -1.08~ (z = -0.63). This result hints at the e.artier prediction result that changes classified as forced departures are more likely to have involved poor management performance and to have been preceded by poor stock performance.
Results for other types of changes.
ResulLt: Monthly abnormal returns
Evidence on the pattern of pro-and pos~anouncement monthly stock peffot'a~mce is p~-esented in table 9 and fig. i . Consistent with the paper's main hypothesis and prediction results in secticn 4.1, top management changes are preceded by negative abnormal performmice. There is no evidence of a market reaction directly linked to the announca .~aent of a management change. Significant negative performance occurs in the month following announcement.
Pre-event abnormal performance. For all WS,/changes, pre-event abnormal performance occurs primarily in the year preceding the change. From table 9, months -30 through -25 and months -24 through -19 have estimated abnormal performance of -1.44~ (z---0.70) and -1.68~ (z=-0.19), respectively; months -12 through -7 have significant negative abnormal performance of -5.025 (z --2.85). For CEO changes, outsiders and forced departures, the estimated levels of negative abnormal performance preceding a change are higher than for all WS] changes. 36 Cumulative mean prediction 3SAlthough not reported in table 8 or 9, a number of addit~on~ attempts are made to partition the sample to improve the power of the event studies. For example, subsamples representing various intersections of the three categories are egamined to isolate those events likely to be most significant. Also, to control for good news or bad news about the firm's prospects, the sample is separated according to how the size of the management team changed. Finally, chauges where a top manager left ",he firm are grouped by r%po_rted r~_~n for the departure. Except for outsider changes (presented ~ table 8), various attempts all failed to find a differential impact at announcement. 36As discussed in section 2, some changes involving outsiders might not be due to inefficiency, but could result from firm expansion. To explore thi~ issue, outsider changes involving increases in the size of the management team are examine-.I separately. For the 25 outsider changes involving increases, the mean cumulative prediction error from months -59 through 0 is 15.44~ (z = 1.15). Thus, for outsider changes involving an iac~ease in management teant size, poor performance did not precede the change. An outsider change is defined as a top management change in which a newly appointed member of the top m ans~enleflt team was not previously art employee of the firm.
CA forced departure is defined as a top manager leaving the firm with no reason reported for the departure or the reported reason is poor performance, other interests, take a position with another firm, poficy difference, or firing. tSignificant at 0.10 leveL ssignificant at 0.05 level.
errors from months -12 through -7 are -6.67% (z = -1.86), -7.18% (z = -2.12), and -14.67% (z---3.52), respectively. For these subsamples, there are indications of poor stock price performance as much as two to three years prior to announcement of the change. This is especially true for forced departures, where the cumulative mean prediction error from months -36 through -13 is -21.44% (z = -2.12).
Abnormal performance at, and following, announcement. the daily data results, thee is negative abnormal performance following the announcement of a top management change. The mean prediction error at month + 1 is -1.25% (z ffi -2.07). This latter result is somewhat stronger for CEO changes and forced departures. For month + 1, the mean prediction errors for these two subsamples are -2.80% (z ffi -2.65) and -2.435 (z---1.95). respectively. For the outsider subsample the mean prediction error is -2.28%, but is not statistically sigxdficant (z ffi -1.51) for month + 1. Given the lag between announcement and the appearance of negative abnormal returns in both daily and monthly results, it is hard to argue that this postannouncement behavior is directly related to the announcement of the change. Further, the significant negative postannouncement behavior does not appear to be induced by the specific methodology use~] to estimate abnormal performance. For example, the picture of negative abnormal performance is similar when only postevent data, as opposed to pre-and postevent data, are used to estimate market model parameters, or when median (rather than mean) prediction errors are examined. 3v Thus, a good explanation for the apparent postannouncement share price fall is lacking.
3?Furthermore, the apparent significance of the m::an predictinn errors in the month following announcement cannot be attributed to a variance increase [see Brown and Warner (1985, p. 22) ]. Although not reported in table 9, examination of mean and median standardized squared prediction errors indicates that no such increase occu Ted.
Summary and conclusions
This paper examines the association between ~tock price performance and top management changes for 269 NYSE and AMEX firms in the period [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] . The major focus is the association between stock performance and subsequent top management changes. In addition, stock price reaction at_ management change announcements is examined. Major results are summarized below.
Predicting top management changes
Results using logit indicate an inverse relation between the probability of a top management change and stock performance. This relation is consistent with the joint hypothesis that 1) information about management performance is reflected in stock returns and 2) such information is used in evaluating management performance. Th_e relation between stock performance and management changes appfies to several types of top management chauges and is consistent with studies of CEO changes [e.g., Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) and Weisbach (1988) ]. Further, while these studies emphasize the role of the board of directors, the board is not the only force disciplining top managers. Although reported details of management changes are often sparse: there is evidence of several internal monitoring mechanisms at work. These include monitoring by blockholders and competition among managers, a:~ well as discipline by the board.
The appropriate benchmark for measuring performance. Investigatioh of the functional form of the share performance/management change relation prorides further evidence on internal monitoring. Adjustment for market factors increases the explanatory power of the logit procedures. For example, for a given level of own stock return, better market performance indicates poorer relative performance and is associated with a higher probability of a top management change. This suggests that management is not held responsible for some factors outside its control. Although similar results do not apply when industry factors are also included, one plausible explanation is that industry factors based on two-digit SIC code are very noisy measures of industry performance.
The strength of the underlying mechanisms. Although the results are consistent with internal monitoring, they also raise questions about the strength of the underlying monitoring mechanisms. Unless share performance is extreme, the logit specification has no predictive ability. Even for firms in the lowest decile of share performance in a given year, the probability of a forced departure in that year is only about 0.06. in addition, any response to share performance is not in, mediate and share performance lagged up to two calendar years help~ predict cun'ent-calendar-year management changes.
Event study results: Mean and variance shift tests
Despite the results obtained with the prediction methodologies, standard event study procedures produce little evidence of nonzero mean abnormal returns at announcement of a top management change~ This finding could occur under several plausible scenarios, for example, if a management change is in shareholders' interest but conveys bad news about the current mana$ement team's perforce. Controlling for such information effects is dimcult, and several attempts to structure hypotheses and partition the sample to provide more informative tests are inconclusive.
Cross-sectional and variance shift tests indicate that management change announcements are associated with small, but statistically significant, abnormal stock price movement, positive in some cases and negative in others. Although further investigation could help explain the stock price reaction, its unimpressive magnitude raises questions about the gains from such an endeavor.
Extension and generalizations
The probability of a top management change is not high, and much about the event is unexplained. One extension of this paper is to examine other measures of firm perfo~maace, such as accounting earnings, and how they influence turnover. This is useful in identifying the variables actually used in evaluating management performance.
Mother extension is to expand the set of firm characteristics used to predict management changes. How the response to poor performance is influenced by the board, by the presence of large blockholders, and by the structure of the top manage~nt team is not well understood.
Finally, a general methodological issue is raised by the contrast between this paper's relatively informative results u~ing !ogit procedures and somewhat uninformative results using event study procedures. The issue is whether to test economic hypotheses by trying to predict an event, or by studying the stock price reaction at announcement of an event. In the accounting literature, comparison of prediction and event study procedures indicates that the former are relatively valuable [see Holthausen and Leftwich (1983, p. 109)] . The extent to which this conclusion applies to corporate control events remains to be determined, and further ~malysis of what determines the efficacy of the alternative procedures is required. 
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Here s~ is the estimated residual standard deviation from firm i's market model regression, R,. is the average market return over the L~ estimation period days (monms), aria -:'¢,.,t is the return to the market index at day (month) t. The standardiz~ prediction error is distributed as a Student-t with (L~-2) degrees of freedom. Since. L,: is large, the disla-ibution is approximately unit normal in the absence of abnormal performance. A cumulative standardized prediction error for testing hypotheses about K-day performance is formed as
,+K
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The cumulative standardized prediction error is also distributed unit normal for large L~. 3s
Invoking the assumption n¢ cross-sectional iudependence and applying the central limit theorem, the following statistics test whether average performance differs from zero:
and for cumulative performance,
A.3. Standardized squared abnormal performance
To test for unusual stock price performance independent of mean effect $ig~, 2. ~.~.~r~d ~t~lar~liT~d ~t~tiefir ie , e~ri 39 From ~ow'ticm A 9 ~h~ ~arl-3SSee Dodd and Warner (1983, p. 437) foi-details. 39As Patell (1976) points out, this test is not strictly a measure of an event-period variance s~h, but is more apprc:~riately viewed az a ~e~t that average performance equals zero and event-period vo~-ia.qce equals estimation-period variance (see especially p. 258).
d~dized prediction error has a Student-t distribution with (L~ -2) degrees of freedom. Hence, the squared value of the standardized prediction error is distributed F(1, L~-2) and E(SPEi, t) 2 = (L~-2)/(L~ -4). Analogous results hold for the cumulative standardized prediclaon errors.
Given market model estimation procedures, L~ is not the same for all firms. To make the standardized squared statistics comparable across firms, a new statistic ~., is formed: Under the assumption that the Ujs axe cross-sectionally independent, the central limit theorem can be applied to construct an approximately normal variate:
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Simulations by Dodd, Dopuch, Holthause~, end Leftwich (1984, p. 37) suggest the above statistic is misspvcified, specifically, that its distribution is fat-tailed, the statistic registering significant performance too often, in this study the same problem arises. For example, in the daffy study oi all nanagestat,,~a~s (37~) are great,~r than merit changes, 33 of the 90 sample-period test
:o"-two in absolute value. To avoid false inferences, the statistical signific~tnce of standardized squared performance is a~ssed using the empmcal distribution of the Ui.:s.
Rankings of mean and median standardized squared prediction er:rors at time 0 relative to those at other times during the announcement period are . distribut2on of the U's from the center to the tails indicates unusual stock price response at announcement. These test procedures are biased against finding unusual stock price behavior, especially if behavior at other ever~t-period times is itself unusual.
